お知らせ

五味洋治のページです。主に韓国での北朝鮮関連報道を訳していますが、日本語で紹介されない記事を私の目でセレクトしています。私の執筆活動、経歴についても掲載しています。最近のお勧めは、北朝鮮の軍事関連報道です。日本のメディアが伝えていない細かなものまで拾っています。私がかつてここに書いた金正恩の性格分析は今も十分通用します。筆者へのご連絡はこちらをクリックしてください

2011年7月31日日曜日

6か国協議再開の5条件 覚え書き

ニューヨークで開かれた米朝高位級会談は、日本の新聞の扱いはまちまちだった。読売、朝日は大きくページを割いたが、日経は小さな扱いだった。

ここ数日じっくりよみくらべると、各紙で違いがある。

今後6か国協議を開くための5条件が新聞にあったので転載し、そこから考えてみる。

2011年7月29日金曜日

封鎖されたソウルの対決路線

私が信頼して読んでいる金さんの記事。
彼は朝鮮語で記事を書いているそうだ。別の人が日本語訳をつけている。
最後に「金桂官次官のニューヨーク訪問を契機に朝鮮の平和攻勢はさらに勢いを増すことだろう」とある。平和攻勢と北朝鮮というのがすこしそぐわない気もする。 

米専門家たち"北,戦略的変化でなく、戦術的変化試みている" ノーカットニュース


ニューヨークで米朝協議が始まった。外務次官と朝鮮半島担当特使という低いクラスの対話だから、劇的に動くということはない。

以下の米国の専門家の話は、アメリカの期待の低さを示している。

2011年7月26日火曜日

北朝鮮は静かなデジタル革命中 AP

 
 北朝鮮が現在、静かなデジタル革命の過程を体験中で、コンピュータをよく扱う若者をあちこちでみることができるとAP通信が25日報道した。
日本や韓国では目新しくない内容だが、アメリカの記者には新奇に見えるのだろう。

平壌支局開設 その狙いは?

 平壌に外国メデイアの支局開設が相次いでいる。2012年の強盛大国に向けた海外向けのアピールではないかと見られる。

以下は私の覚え書きです。他にも動きがあればお教えください。

2011年7月25日月曜日

AP通信 北朝鮮ルポ 「異質な外国」の中に感じる郷愁

翻訳しようとおもっていたら、日本語の訳があったので転載しておきます。

記者会見にAP通信の参加が許されたとも書いてあった。APがどこまで取材を許されるのかは不透明。

http://sankei.jp.msn.com/world/news/110725/kor11072514110001-n1.htm

2011年7月24日日曜日

ロ,対北朝鮮ガス供給プロジェクト集中検討 聯合

最近ロシアの動きが怪しい。中国依存を強める北朝鮮に焦りをいだき、ガスを使って間に割り込もうとしているようにみえる。

これには3つの意味がある。

①北朝鮮を抜け日本につながるパイプラインを建造し、ガスを高く売る。今、ロシアは中国にはパイプラインを敷いているが、価格が安く抑えられている。

②北朝鮮に安いエネルギーを提供することで、核開発を止めさせることができ、ロシアの国際的地位が向上する。

③朝ロ関係はメドベージェフ時代に悪化したが、プーチン派が北朝鮮を取り込み、政治的成果にする。

この思惑は成功するのか。以下の聯合ニュースをお読みください。

2011年7月23日土曜日

英国シンクタンクが分析した北朝鮮

北朝鮮の安全保障上の挑戦 英国のシンクタンクiissがまとめた報告書。
訳したいところだが、時間の関係上要約の英文を掲載しておきます。
北朝鮮の韓国攻撃の可能性が低くなっていると書いている。


North Korean security challenges: a net assessment - Executive Summary


The immediate security challenges posed by North Korea are formidable. On the military front, these include nearly the full array of weapons of mass destruction: a plutonium-based nuclear weapons program now supplemented by uranium enrichment; the world’s third largest chemical weapons arsenal, possibly biological weapons and a range of ballistic missiles that may be able to deliver these weapons to South Korea and Japan. The threat from these weapons is not just direct. The concern that North Korea would transfer nuclear weapons technology to other rogue states or terrorists for financial profit or barter is not fanciful; it has been threatened.

North Korea’s lethal attacks in 2010 on a South Korean warship and a populated island were vivid reminders of the conventional military threats posed by North Korea and the potential for resumed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Despite economic impoverishment and an inability to feed its people, North Korea remains highly armed, determined to seize advantage through asymmetric capabilities, and ready to fire first. North Korea remains the most militarised country on earth. Its Korean People’s Army is the world’s fourth largest; its expanded special forces are the biggest anywhere. Although a long economic decline and enhanced capabilities in South Korea make any option to invade seem less credible today than in the past, the North has many ways to inflict harm and sow terror without invading. Electronic warfare is among the other forms of asymmetric capabilities that make Seoul feel vulnerable.

Meanwhile North Korea has engaged in diverse forms of state-sponsored crime, including the kidnapping of foreign nationals, trafficking in narcotics and many other forms of contraband, and the counterfeiting of foreign currency. This criminality and the refugee flows, human trafficking and other complications arising from the regime’s systematic mistreatment of its own people pose additional security challenges, both direct and indirect, for North Korea’s neighbours and the wider international community. It is a moot point whether the Kim regime is more of a menace to its own subjects or the wider world. Its provocative behaviour increases the risk that eventually somebody, whether within or outside, will be goaded to retaliate.

The threats that North Korea presents to the outside world are inextricably linked to its domestic situation. The leadership’s hyper-militarism, decades of mismanagement and refusal of reform have impoverished the country. Without foreign assistance and a structural overhaul, the North has no realistic prospect of sustainable development. With political control and regime protection its overriding concerns, however, the leadership has been unwilling to undertake the bold structural reforms and transparency measures necessary to resuscitate the economy, or to give up its nuclear-weapons programme in exchange for the foreign assistance and trade that could rescue the nation from its poverty. Instead, Kim Jong-il has turned to the military, designating a ‘military first’ (songun) policy as the regime’s guiding ideology.

Yet the collapse of the public food distribution system in the mid-1990s, the growth of private markets and increased knowledge of the outside world have led North Korean society to start fracturing. A traditional communist class structure based on political standards is changing to one determined by income, and as more North Koreans become involved in market activities the greater the income disparities that emerge. The magnitude and pace of social change in North Korea is often overestimated, but the direction of it is indisputable.

The dynastic succession now beginning to unfold in Pyongyang and the uncertainties this entails exacerbate the potential for conflict. Kim Jong-il’s precise health remains unclear. He appears to have largely recovered from his stroke in summer 2008. Last year’s sudden acceleration of the transition of power is convincing evidence, however, that his longevity is an issue of concern. The succession so far appears to be going smoothly. However, his designated successor, third son Kim Jong-un, will face severe disadvantages because of his lack of experience, his fragile power base, the political constraints on economic reform and the military’s role in politics. In almost all respects, the external and internal conditions are less favourable for this second generation succession than for the first dynastic transfer after the death of regime founder Kim Il-sung in 1994. This could make North Korea an even more dangerous nation, more inclined to engage in further military provocations, to cling to its weapons of mass destruction and to offer them for sale to any would-be buyer. The Kim family will have to rely heavily on physical power exercised by the military and the state-security apparatus in order to ensure a successful succession. In pursuit of the goal of becoming a ‘strong and prosperous great nation’ by 2012, the centennial of the founding father’s birth, such military capabilities are all that the regime can summon.

Nuclear and missile capabilities

North Korea has enough plutonium for a handful of nuclear weapons. How much plutonium and how many weapons are impossible to estimate accurately except within broad ranges: enough for 4–12 bombs, although most likely fewer than ten. It cannot be confidently said that North Korea has developed reliable, deliverable nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it will eventually be able to develop a warhead capable of fitting on a ballistic missile with satisfactory re-entry technology, especially if it conducts further nuclear tests to refine its weapon design.

Pyongyang has made frequent references to using its nuclear weapons, which are portrayed as essential to deterring an attack. But the weapons largely serve a political purpose. Any actual North Korea offensive use of nuclear weapons would lead to its annihilation. North Korea perceives its nuclear weapons as a way of ensuring its prestige and influence on the international stage and of bolstering the regime’s internal legitimacy; the only way to compensate for economic deficiencies. The regime no longer refers to the possibility of relinquishing its nuclear assets in return for political and economic concessions. It has said that it will only feel no need to retain its nuclear weapons once the American ‘nuclear threat is removed and South Korea is cleared of its nuclear umbrella’. Given that the first of these conditions is highly subjective and the second is very unlikely (as it would require the end of the US–South Korea alliance), it appears that Pyongyang perceives its nuclear weapons as a permanent feature.
The missile programme serves a similar political purpose. North Korea has established one of the world’s largest ballistic-missile arsenals, exported such missiles to many countries, and conducted provocative tests of longer-range systems and space launchers that could be converted into long-range missiles.

It is very likely, however, that North Korea has historically relied on foreign sources for its supply of Hwasong, Nodong, Musudan and KN-02 missiles. If unsanctioned supply channels have been shut down or sufficiently attenuated, then North Korea may no longer be able to export missiles in large numbers. It would also be unable to expand its missile forces appreciably.

Despite Pyongyang’s limited indigenous production capabilities, it continues to show considerable interest in developing a satellite-launch capability, as well as longer-range ballistic missiles, possibly including an ICBM. North Korea has the wherewithal to develop these systems if it so decides. Future space launchers and long-range missiles will be founded on technologies available to North Korea, primarily legacy engines and components from the former Soviet Union. Although many of these technologies are considered obsolete elsewhere in the world, they can be configured to create the range–payload envelope that North Korea apparently seeks. Such systems will take time to develop and will require an ambitious flight-test programme, which should provide the world at least five years of warning before they become combat ready.

Moreover, the systems will have limited strategic capabilities for the foreseeable future, will not be fielded in large numbers and will likely have poor performance accuracy and reliability.

Surprises are always possible. North Korean leaders might be willing to accept tremendous risk and deploy a missile before it is fully developed. Prematurely fielding missiles such as the Musudan will not provide North Korea with a reliable capability. But if the unproven systems are deployed in ways that can be detected by Pyongyang’s adversaries, they may have value for political and deterrence purposes.

Four crises

With the DPRK under more pressure than ever before, the possibility that the regime might begin to unravel cannot be ignored. The Kim regime has long defied predictions of its collapse. It has survived major challenges, including a change of leadership, a catastrophic famine and the demise of its major sponsor. Amidst all this, it successfully defied the world to become a nuclear power. Yet the crises which now beset North Korea are multiple and acute. The regime may be on the cusp of drastic change.
The current crisis has four aspects, all interlinked. Politically, successions are the Achilles’ heel of dictatorships. Kim Il-sung knew this, and prepared his son’s rise to power meticulously over three decades. Kim Jong-il, by contrast, was very tardy in anointing a son of his own as heir. The sooner he dies, the less likely that his son’s succession will go smoothly.

North Korea’s second crisis is economic, and has multiple dimensions. The ‘great leap backwards’ of the past 20 years has left the state, and most North Koreans, poorer than in 1989 when Soviet aid kept it afloat.

Specific tension points include a potential inability to feed even the military, or the relatively privileged capital city. The rash official pledge to create a ‘strong and prosperous nation’ by 2012 may rebound to haunt the regime. More generally, an impoverished and increasingly disenchanted populace, which has become more aware by various means that in South Korea and even China others live much better, may not put up with such misery and oppression indefinitely.

North Korea’s third crisis is external: its relations with the outside world. The Kim regime has long played the role of provocateur on many fronts: first to South Korea, and latterly to the wider region and world with its nuclear and missile threats. In the past there was method in this: militant mendicancy enabled North Korea to blow hot and cold, raising tensions and then in effect angling to be paid to stop. But this approach depends on the willingness of others to play the game, and all interlocutors have tired of it. Such brinkmanship is also risky. It could have led to a second Korean war in 1994, while the two attacks on South Korea in 2010 make it almost impossible for President Lee Myung-bak not to strike back hard if Pyongyang is rash enough to attack it again.

The fourth crisis facing the DPRK is more existential. In the context of a divided nation, North Korea has always falsely portrayed itself as the guardian of Korean nationalism and the rightful, legitimate heir of the true Korean spirit. Today this lie faces fresh challenges at home. In practice, the North has surrendered its vaunted juche philosophy of ‘independence’ since it depends crucially on Chinese aid and political support. Meanwhile, for citizens the myth is wearing thin; the poverty and oppression of everyday life makes the official line that they have ‘nothing to envy’ ring hollow.

Unification scenarios

In light of these multiple crises, Korean unification is no longer purely hypothetical. One cannot, of course, rule out a continuation of the status quo. North Korea’s collapse has been confidently forecast by many experts for over 20 years. But the fact that against all odds and expectations North Korea is still defiantly there, almost a generation after communist regimes elsewhere either collapsed or embraced a different economic model, should make any analyst cautious about making further predictions about the Kims’ demise. On the other hand, the ferment in the Arab world this year is a reminder that no regime lasts forever.

We postulate four broad scenarios to unification. The optimal one is a soft landing, whereby over time North Korea stops doing the things which make it a menace. If the Kims do finally come in from the cold, it could lead to reconciliation and maybe to a peaceful and gradual integration. However, the Kim regime shows no sign of fundamental change; certain negative behavioural patterns may now be hard-wired. Even if the regime does accept a more liberalised economy, it is very unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons.

A second positive scenario is German-style reunification by absorption and a voluntary or peaceful collapse of the Kim regime. This is also extremely unlikely. So militant and militarised is North Korea that it seems unimaginable for it to crumble peacefully.

A third scenario is unification through North Korean collapse the hard way. Unless the Kim regime does a U-turn, it is increasingly likely that North Korea’s accumulating contradictions will sooner or later unleash a contingency of some kind. This would probably be an internal challenge, although any further provocation against South Korea risks provoking strong military retaliation, which could trigger further events or spiral out of control.

North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons further complicates an intricate and dangerous situation in the event of a disputatious collapse. The nightmare scenario would be if ROK intervention in the North, perhaps including its US ally in an urgent quest for ‘loose nukes’ were perceived as hostile by Beijing, leading to a direct military confrontation between two superpowers. It is vital, if politically difficult, that the ROK, the US and China plan trilaterally and discreetly in advance to prevent this.

A DPRK collapse, with conflict leading the ROK to intervene, is similar to a fourth scenario of reunification through war. This is often assumed to be unthinkable. There is little doubt that the South would win such a war – our chapter on the military balance explains why – but a full-scale conflict in the age of missiles and WMD could lay waste to the whole peninsula again for a generation. Yet complacency seems ill-advised. Actions can be misperceived and tensions escalate. North Korea’s two attacks last year were a dangerous and perhaps desperate escalation of brinkmanship. If Pyongyang tries it again, it would be politically all but impossible for any ROK President not to retaliate forcibly.

For completeness, it is also necessary to consider another possible outcome on the peninsula: that North Korea may succeed in maintaining its regime sheltering under the wing of China. Most unification discourse assumes that South Korea is bound to inherit the North. It is important to think through the implications for reunification if China is determined, as it seems to be, to sustain North Korea ‘as is’. China seems to have made a strategic decision that a unified Korea under Seoul leadership and allied to the US goes fundamentally against its interests. Since mid-2010 Chinese policy has moved sharply and visibly to prop up the Kim Jong-il regime and strengthen ties at all levels, from endorsing Kim Jong-un’s succession to de facto diplomatic support for the North’s acts of aggression. Beijing has both the financial and the military muscle to protect the Kim regime and keep it afloat. In a word, it has both the motive and the means.

Hence, unwelcome though this may be in Seoul, a plausible alternative scenario for North Korea’s future is that it may increasingly become a de facto satellite of China. This is not what Pyongyang would have wanted, but does it have any alternative? If it is a matter of regime survival the Kims are in no position to resist Chinese patronage. If North Korea thus moves into China’s orbit, this will pose complex challenges for South Korea. There is no need and no chance that China would in any way formally annex or occupy the DPRK. But a client state is another matter.

正恩氏への世襲、平坦でない 中国の保護下で延命も 英戦略研、北情勢を分析
2011.7.22 21:14
産経

 【ロンドン=木村正人】元米国務次官補代理で朝鮮半島問題にも詳しい英シンクタンク、国際戦略研究所(IISS)のマーク・フィッツパトリック氏は22日までに北朝鮮の情勢報告書をまとめ、金正日総書記から三男の正恩氏への権力継承は故金日成主席から金総書記への継承に比べ平坦(へいたん)ではなく、軍事的挑発行為をエスカレートさせる恐れがあると指摘した。

 フィッツパトリック氏によると、健康状態が危ぶまれる金総書記は昨年から継承手続きを加速させ、今のところ順調に進んでいるように見える。しかし正恩氏の経験不足、権力基盤の脆弱(ぜいじゃく)性、経済改革や軍の政治的役割をめぐる軋轢(あつれき)など問題が山積し、前回の継承に比べ極めて不利な状況に直面。こうした不安定さを覆い隠すため、北朝鮮が軍事的挑発や大量破壊兵器製造を拡大させ、さらに「危険な国」になる恐れがあると警告している。

 フィッツパトリック氏は、北朝鮮は10個未満の核弾頭を製造できるプルトニウムを保有しウラン濃縮活動も進めているが、「現時点で運搬可能な信頼性の高い核兵器を開発したとはいえない」と分析。「核使用は米国の徹底報復を招くため、核や弾道ミサイルを政治的な駆け引きに使っている」と指摘する。

 中国は昨年半ば以降、正恩氏への権力継承から軍事行動に対する事実上の外交的支援に至るまで北朝鮮を支える姿勢を鮮明にしており、連携を強化したとフィッツパトリック氏は分析。「韓国主導で再統一が実現し、米国と同盟を結ぶ事態になれば根本的に自国の国益に反するとの戦略的判断を中国は行ったもようだ」と語った。また、北朝鮮が事実上、中国の保護国になり政権延命を図るシナリオも考えられると指摘した。

核実験で性能改善目指す=北朝鮮めぐり報告書-戦略研
 【ロンドン時事】ロンドンの国際戦略研究所(IISS)は21日、北朝鮮が国際社会にもたらしている安全保障上の問題をまとめた包括的な報告書を発表し、北朝鮮が将来、さらに核実験を実施して核兵器の性能改善を目指す可能性が最も高いと分析した。
 報告書は、北朝鮮の核実験について「実験によって醸成される政治状況をうまく利用しようという狙いや、核物質の貯蔵量によって時期が左右される」と指摘。一方で「北朝鮮にとって核は主として政治的な兵器だ」とし、「体制崩壊の危機があるとの認識がなければ実際には使用されない」(報告書責任者のフィッツパトリック部長)とみている。
 また、日本も射程に入る中距離ミサイル・ノドンに核を搭載することに関しては「兵器化および断熱といった技術問題に直面している」としながらも、「中期的には問題を克服できる可能性が高い」と強調した。 
 記者会見した同部長は「北朝鮮がつくり出している安保上の課題は極めて大きい。世界で3番目の化学兵器保有大国であり、弾道ミサイルで日本や韓国に送り込むことも可能かもしれない」と指摘。「外貨獲得などのために核兵器技術を他のならず者国家やテロリストに譲り渡す懸念もある」と注意を促した。(2011/07/21-21:13)

2011年7月16日土曜日

北朝鮮とミヤンマー⑥ 軍事へのビルマ-DPRK協力

このレポートは、ミヤンマーと北朝鮮の関係を追い続けている核専門家のレポート。原文は英語。翻訳のサイトで荒く訳し、現在手直ししている。徐々に訳を整えたいが、私が読んだ中では最も優れている。情報の質もきちんと判断しているという点で評価できる。

北朝鮮とミヤンマー⑤ 米国の静かだが執拗な北朝鮮に対する圧迫作戦 なぜ北朝鮮船舶は戻ったか

今年に入って起きた、北朝鮮船舶追跡事件。北朝鮮とミヤンマーに対する総合的な監視は静かに続いている。

2011年7月15日金曜日

北朝鮮消息筋“コカコーラ-KFC側最近北朝鮮訪問…支店開設協議” 東亜日報


昨日韓国のYTNテレビが報じて関心を集めているニュース。詳しく伝えている東亜日報でみている。かなり先走った印象も受ける。最近、投資誘致がうまくいっていないので、わざと流しているのではないか。

2011年7月14日木曜日

北朝鮮とミヤンマー④ クリントンの憂慮

ミヤンマー北朝鮮関係では、2009年ごろから米国が憂慮を表明してきた。

このころからインテリジェンスからの何らかの具体的情報があったのだと思われる。

金正日・正恩父子、張徳江中国副首相と面会 中朝の報道

中朝友好協力相互援助条約締結50年に関連する中朝の報道ぶりをみると顕著な違いはないが、中国側は50年前の締結時にふれつつ、平和実現に向けての意義を強調。金総書記も「条約の精神を受け継ぐ」と述べており、当面このままで行くようである。

2011年7月13日水曜日

訪朝の張徳江副首相 崔永林首相と会見 新華ネットより

 

いま、中朝間で相互援助条約50年の式典が行われている。今後の両国関係を占う重要なポイントなので、報道を拾い集めておきます。ミヤンマー・北朝鮮関係はしばらくお休みです。

2011年7月11日月曜日

北韓-ミャンマー'黒いコネクション'ふくらむか③ 江南号事件


二年ほど前からミヤンマーと北朝鮮は疑われてきたが、2009年のこの事件で米国が徹底マークすることになる。

当時の記事を翻訳してみた。

2011年7月10日日曜日

北朝鮮とミヤンマー②国交回復 その意味 朝鮮日報ブログより

2007年にミヤンマーと北朝鮮が国交回復した時の記事。いままさに、この記事のようになっている。

http://blog.chosun.com/blog.log.view.screen?blogId=8745&menuId=33895&listType=2&from=&to=&curPage=1&logId=2039634

北朝鮮とミヤンマー① 二つの国の共通項

最近、集中的にミヤンマーと北朝鮮の関係に関する文章を読んでいる。双方とも閉鎖社会であり、何が進んでいるのか見えにくい。米国という共通の敵がいるだけに、協力もしやすい。さらにその後ろには中国の存在も見え隠れする。

2011年7月9日土曜日

中,対北朝鮮圧迫から生存支援に政策転換"  韓国cbsニュース

一般的には2009年7月に、中国は対北朝鮮政策を転換したとされるが、米国でもこの点を感じていたようだ。北朝鮮の生存優先になっているということは、その分不安定になりかねないと判断しているということだろう。記事に引用されている報告書http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf

は、同じ題名でも、継続してrevision(改訂)されている。

2011年7月4日月曜日

羅先開発 電力は問題ない 統一ニュース

 

韓国のネットニュースの「統一ニュース」に珍しい写真が掲載されていたので、転載させていただく。

北朝鮮東北部で着工された、羅先経済特区でのセメント工場の起工式の写真だ。中朝が協力している。これはすでに日本でも報道されているが、本当だったようだ。写真によれば年産100万トンとある。港や道路補修にはセメントが欠かせないのだろう。

さらに電力問題もめどがついているらしいが、順調に行くかはまだはっきりしないところだ。

2011年7月1日金曜日

「8月1日から「アリラン」公演」 朝鮮中央通信より

今年は正恩の文字が出てくるか。

詳細は以下でお読みください。

平壌に大粛清リスト出回る 開かれた北朝鮮放送

最近、本当に多くの粛正ニュースが流れる。一部は銃殺されているらしいが、こんな国が世界にあるのだろうか。

しかも、今後も続きそうだ。今回の粛正は、3男が主導しているという。詳しくは以下を。